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The continued failure of land reform has been one of the most contentious issues
in the political economy of Nepal for over half-a-century. Civil war (1996-2006)
ended with cross-party commitments to implement ‘scientific’ land reform and
end feudalism, putting the issue firmly back in the spotlight. Moving beyond
traditional land reform debates this paper determines whether the necessary
foundations are in place to provide a platform for successful pro-poor
redistributive reform. Through the analytical lens of Borras and McKinley’s
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elements of contemporary state-society driven redistributive reform: a
beneficiaries-led movement, pro-reform political consensus, productivityenhancing support to agriculture and an overarching pro-poor growth-oriented
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reform cannot balance on a single pillar and the new democratic republic faces a
considerable challenge to underpin its commitments.
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1.0

Introduction

1.1

The Case of Nepal

Nepal is one of the world‟s poorest countries, ranking 144 out of 182 in
the UNDP‟s (2009) HDR, with 31% of Nepal‟s 28.8 million people living below
the poverty line (WB, 2010). Landlocked between the giants of India and China,
Nepal‟s unique and varied topography renders 80% of the land uncultivable, yet
agriculture remains the mainstay of the Nepalese economy, providing
employment to 83% of the population and accounting for a secularly declining
33% of GDP (WB, 2010). The agricultural sector has stagnated due to semifeudal relations of production and persistent underinvestment, while productivity
has failed to keep pace with rapid population growth, causing serious concern for
food security.1 2
Landlessness and indebtedness are growing problems amongst rural
households, interrelated with the persistence of serfdom, insecure tenancy, land
fragmentation and absentee landlordism. Land distribution is highly skewed, with
7.5% of farmers owning nearly a third of the farming area (3% hold 17.3% of
private farm land) and almost half (47.7%) of all land holdings are too small to
meet subsistence needs, within a largely subsistence based production system.3
There is a clear negative correlation between the size of land holding and level of
poverty, which underscores current trends in out-migration, urbanisation, off-farm
unskilled daily wage work and renting-in of additional land for sharecropping
(Adhikari, 2008). One of the key constraints to agricultural productivity, social
mobility and economic opportunity has been acknowledged for over half-acentury as the pattern of ownership and access to land.
Since the overthrow of the Rana regime in 1951, reforms to Nepal‟s land
relations have consistently featured on political agendas. The 1964 Lands Act
became the first comprehensive programme of reforms and remains at the centre
of land policy today. Despite a number of amendments to the Lands Act the
overall programme has failed in its objectives; significant redistribution has been
evaded, productivity has not improved and off-farm growth has failed to
materialise. Shortfalls in planning, investment and implementation are
symptomatic of the systemic failure in political conviction, linked to deep-rooted
landlord-state alliances (Alden-Wily, 2009).
The continued failure of land reform has proved one of the most
contentious issues in the political economy of Nepal for over half-a-century.
Maoist insurgents adopted the rallying call „land to the tiller‟ during Nepal‟s
decade-long civil war (1996-2006), while peasant movements have become
increasingly organised, applying pressure to state actors and raising public
consciousness. The civil war ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace
Accord (CPA) in 2006 followed by the 2007 Interim Constitution (IC) pledge “to
implement a scientific4 land reform…ending the existing feudal system of land
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ownership”, as part of a vision for a “prosperous, modern and just…new Nepal”
(GoN, 2007); putting land reform firmly at the forefront of national political
debate.
1.2

Can Nepal’s Proposed Land Reform Stand Up?

Under political mandate, and socio-economic imperative, Nepal is on the
verge of planning a significant programme of land reform; consequently this
paper does not seek to add to an already comprehensive literature discussing the
social, political and economic arguments for redistributive land reform, in the face
of cross-party political commitments, this paper will move beyond the
fundamental debate to determine whether the necessary foundations are in place
to provide a platform for successful pro-poor redistributive land reform in Nepal.
Borras and McKinley (2006) synthesised the salient features from
contemporary and historical land reforms in developing their “4 pillars”
paradigm; representing the four fundamental elements necessary to achieve a
successful “redistributive alternative”.5 Moving away from binary models of
state-led and market-led reform, this paradigm frames a state-society driven,
productivity-enhancing redistribution, underpinned by a broader concept of land,
beyond its economic value, and of land reform in the context of reallocating
property and power towards a pro-poor agrarian transition. If the political rhetoric
is to be believed and the peasants‟ demands heard, this is precisely the land
reform that Nepal will be planning; if inclusive growth is to be achieved, it is
exactly the land reform that Nepal needs. Nepal has yet to specify any details of
proposed reforms, beyond broad political rhetoric, but it is the clear view of this
paper that to achieve success Nepal will need to compare favourably vis-à-vis
Borras and McKinley’s 4 pillars.
The first pillar represents a beneficiaries-led social movement,
highlighting (without romanticising) the importance of autonomous and inclusive
rural politics in shaping and leading the process through the mobilisation of
pressure from below. The second pillar comprises a supportive state, recognising
the seat of ultimate authority and incorporating the need for a complementary proreform political coalition; with state-society linkages providing a key dynamic in
shaping and strengthening these first two pillars. Realising the need for improved
productivity to ensure sustainability, the third pillar constitutes supportive and
complementary agricultural policy, while the fourth pillar represents the wider
macro-economic environment and a pro-poor growth-orientated country
development strategy. This interactive framework provides a relevant
methodology for exploring the interlinked themes of rural politics and capital
accumulation, which together with the character of agrarian production and
overarching development strategy will have profound effects upon the success of
land reform in Nepal.
2
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2.0

Analytic Framework: The 4 Pillars Paradigm

Drawing on historical experiences and recent UNDP-ISS country studies6,
Borras and McKinley identify four fundamental elements (“pillars”) necessary to
underpin success; these comprise a beneficiaries-led (1), state-supported (2),
productivity-enhancing (3), pro-poor growth-oriented (4) paradigm.
The first pillar recognises the key role of rural struggles in shaping
agrarian-based social and economic relations, which are both the causes and
consequences of dominant regimes of land policy. The model avoids
romanticising the power of peasant beneficiaries, while still acknowledging that
when large peasant populations mobilise (and sustain their mobilisation) they can
challenge and undermine state-elite alliances. There are important elements to this
pillar; comprising the level of autonomy, capacity to organise and achieve aims
and the extent and influence of wider societal allies, providing a more nuanced
understanding of the interaction between beneficiaries, civil society and the state,
in driving reform. It is insufficient to simply record the presence or absence of a
land rights movement (LRM) in Nepal, but, as with social movements in general,
to analyse their historical contingency, political strategies, methods of
mobilisation and degrees of solidarity
The presence of a strong LRM does not in itself guarantee success and the
redistribution of economic power in rural areas will likely need active support
from the state, where authority ultimately rests. The commitment and capacity of
state reformists is key to overcoming both national elite opposition and increasing
penetration by neoliberal forces. Through historical analysis, pro-reform political
consensus will be assessed in the context of democratisation, state restructuring,
peace-building and the ongoing constitution-drafting processes, with the state
viewed inherently as “both an actor and an arena of contestation”, balancing
competing attitudes towards land reform (Borras and Franco, 2008).
Political support for reform must eventually translate into substantial
public investment along with technical assistance to enable a small farmer,
productivity-enhancing revolution, so significant to successful reforms in Japan,
Taiwan and Korea. Borras and McKinley recognise that redistributing land is
insufficient in itself to mobilise resources, enhance productivity and generate
market-competitive small farmers; a third pillar comprising public fiscal and
service support is necessary, both to boost the reform‟s short-term efficacy and
strengthen its sustainability.7 Pillar 3 will be assessed with particular reference to
the policy ideology, institutional structure and resource mobilisation of Nepal‟s
Agriculture Perspective Plan (APP), which outlines the strategy and objectives for
the commercialisation of agriculture.
An integral feature of Borras and McKinley‟s paradigm is the
interdependence and synergy between pillars, with a beneficiaries-led
3
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productivity increase needing wider support from an overarching development
strategy, complementary to pro-poor growth. Without national policy geared to
growth for the rural poor, land reform‟s potential for harnessing the povertyreducing effect of land could be undermined, or subjugated to more anodyne
attempts at poverty alleviation. Ultimately though, development strategy must
incorporate land reform, to equitably restructure the socio-economic base and
enable the pro-poor element of any growth to work more effectively. Pillar 4 will
assess Nepal‟s pro-poor credentials in the context of neoliberal policy,
international donor-led development, commitment to the MDGs and institutional
devolution, with these competing national and global influences shaping a
complex set of development opportunities and constraints.
There are a number of structural impediments, which, for the most part,
exist outside of the 4 pillars paradigm, but never-the-less act as complex barriers
to agricultural productivity and development; rugged topography, geographical
remoteness, rigid caste hierarchies, climate change, population pressure, a porous
border with India and the destruction of recent civil war; all having, to a greater or
lesser extent, profound effects upon the foundations for redistributive reform,
which this methodology cannot address directly.8 9
3.0

The 4 Pillars of Land Reform: Nepal

3.2

Pillar 1: Beneficiaries-led Reform

Nepal‟s history of social struggles for land rights began as far back as the
late 18th Century, though only adopting its more recognisable and cohesive form
since the overthrow of the oppressive Rana regime in 1951. The following decade
saw the formation of the landless people‟s movement (Sukumbasi) which backed
multi-party elections in 1959 and pressed the first comprehensive, but ultimately
failed attempt at land reform in 1964.10 11
The 1990 People‟s Movement bridged multiparty political solidarity with
popular protest to reinstitute democracy, and this state-society synthesis has
intensified, gaining significant momentum from a civil war substantially driven
by land-based inequality and resolved with a commitment to pro-poor land
reform. The LRM has become increasingly active in politicising land issues
without itself becoming politicised, an important distinction given the tendency
for sister organisations of Nepal‟s political parties to co-opt peasant movements,
sidelining those most in need. With many farmers‟ organisations either captured
by richer farmers or subjugated by landlord-state alliances, the focus of the LRM
has shifted onto landless farmers, tenants and bonded labourers.12
In addition to the painful memories of civil war, illustrating unaddressed
land grievances13, a number of factors have strengthened the LRM in recent years:
the growing frustration with a stagnant agricultural sector; more inclusive
democracy with trends towards devolved governance; a broadening political
4
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consensus (at least in rhetoric) to end feudal land relations; growing international
solidarity; and a fuller understanding of rural poverty, leading to an appreciation
that peaceful and sustainable growth in agrarian states requires a relatively
equitable base.
The LRM is spearheaded today by the National Land Rights Forum
(NLRF), an expansive peasant-led network of village-level organisations,
enabling and mobilising ≈300,000 land-deprived households across 50 districts
(CSRC, 2010).14 15 In addition to educating and organising land-poor farmers the
NLRF focuses on building public consensus for pro-poor reform, developing
state-society bridges and innovating practicable community-led models for
decentralised and democratised land reform.16 NLRF leaders have built robust,
non-politicised, high-level state alliances, through persistent peaceful advocacy
while creating linkages with a select handful of international donors.17 18
The NLRF is committed to maximising internal funding to enhance
sustainability through a sense of ownership, taking pride in its inclusive and
democratic institutional operation; with a membership comprising 48% females
and 56% Dalits (former untouchables) it represents a diverse range of rural poor,
including landless labourers, marginal farmers, indigenous people and rural
women. Creating such coalitions has necessitated the crossing of traditional social
barriers to extend the scope of reform.19 20 21
The LRM has widened its political strategy with a broadened agenda now
closely aligned with civil demands for human rights, particularly for women and
former lower castes. Advocating the link between land rights and rights of
subsistence, protection, participation and identity has opened new political spaces
and incorporated new social forces, that provide both physical and symbolic
leverage to a land reform agenda that still retains its venerable core of agrarian
class antagonism (to be overcome by structural change to power relations). In
Nepal‟s increasingly democratised and politicised society, all but the most
conservative political forces are compelled to express solidarity with the
vulnerable; while appeals to food security and peace building, as well as
universals such as democratisation and ecological guardianship, expand land
reform from justice for the poor to benefiting society as a whole, and arguably
extending to a „global society‟, in building widespread consent. Democracy‟s
power is not simply that the rule of the majority will empower the poor (a fallacy
of homogenising the poor) but that democratisation enables inclusion in collective
decision making and joint ownership of outcomes, key to beneficiaries-led
reform.
The success of the LRM strategy is manifested by the incorporation of
beneficiary demands into political party agendas, and occasionally policy; most
notably in the allocation of land to freed Kamaiyas22, joint husband/wife titling,
discounted land registration fees for women and the establishment of a HighLevel Commission on Land Reform (2008). However, the failure of the High
5
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Level Commission on land reform to fully implement any of their objectives,
illustrates the chasm between word and deed, necessitating sustained pressure
from below.
It is this pervasive lack of political will that led Borras and McKinley to
emphasise the importance of beneficiaries in leading a democratised land reform
process and in Nepal they have taken the initiative to design and trial models for
community-led land reform. The NLRF are currently piloting „land reform from
below‟ in 5 districts, with local communities collecting accurate records,
including for land holdings, tenancy arrangements, pubic land use and
absenteeism, with which to inform state decision makers (CSRC, 2010). While
the promulgation of Nepal‟s Local Self-Governance Act (LSGA) in 1999, began a
network of District and Village Development Committees as part of a gradual
policy of devolution, potentially providing the decentralised institutional
architecture for beneficiaries-led reform.23
Collective action remains central for the poor to leverage their political
capital and the NLRF regularly stages mass demonstrations, marches and sit-ins
to bolster the channels of lobbying and policy advocacy. Peaceful protest is a key
tenet of NLRF strategy, gaining even greater merit within a post-conflict society
that disparages violence as a means-to-an-end (Alden-Wily, 2009). However,
some Maoist splinter groups, such as the Krantikari Sukumbasi Sang
(Revolutionary Landless Association), have continued the practice of their
wartime counterparts in seizing private land, with this approach likely to
jeopardise public opinion.
Landlord-state alliances pose substantial barriers but increasing levels of
autonomy, inclusiveness and state-society institutional bridging offer positive
signs that the majority land-poor can shape, implement and sustain a process of
redistributive land reform. The progressive political agency of beneficiaries,
together with a supportive civil society and moves towards devolved governance,
constitute a solid first pillar for Nepal‟s land reform; but this cannot support the
process alone. As Borras and McKinley emphasise, a powerful alliance of state
reformists is a necessary pillar in tandem.
3.2

Pillar 2: Pro-Reform Political Consensus

Land governance in Nepal was subject to capricious rulers until the
introduction of the first comprehensive Lands Act in 1964, promulgated in
response to an incipient LRM with the aim of “showing a human face”. The Act
emphasised protecting existing power structures and half-hearted implementation
allowed ample room for landlord evasion, ensuring little redistribution. The Act
remains at the centre of contemporary policy and despite six amendments,
consistently fails to deliver the egalitarian social justice promised in the rhetoric.
The main outcome of imposing ceilings has been concealment of ownership; the
6
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main result of land administration reform has been authentication of elite title; a
main consequence of tenancy registration was eviction; and the upshot of
modernisation has been the violation of customary rights.
This lack of political commitment has been the key impediment to
genuine land reform; a common characteristic of failed reforms globally. Nepal‟s
decision makers face a conflict of interests, with state leaders bearing close ties to
landlords (if they are not landlords themselves) and unwilling to forego privileges
or sever longstanding shared interests. Herring (1999) describes this conundrum
succinctly: “Land confers power in agrarian systems; reform policy must then
work through a system of power to overthrow its base. Not only would one
predict little policy, but as importantly little implementation”; a circumstance so
vividly illustrated by Nepal‟s half-century of failure. In the absence of
alternatives, land holds the key to economic, and by implication, political power,
serving to maintain the status quo. Land reform‟s ability to restructure power
relations, stimulate alternatives and underpin social democracy creates a clear
„chicken and egg‟ dilemma for Nepal‟s state-supported beneficiaries-led reform.24
The advent of social democracy (1990/1), accompanied by a burgeoning
civil society, freer press and invigorated LRM, has created space for more
inclusive dialogue to forge broader political consensus. Successive governments
have responded with revitalised „land to the tiller‟ platitudes, however, the return
to democracy has been plagued by inter-party wrangling and intra-party
factionalism. Against a background of self-serving politicians failing the poor, the
Maoists launched their „People‟s War‟ (1996-2006), with the aim of realising
socio-economic transformation through armed struggle, with land reform as their
rallying call.25 Rebel actors had seized the reform initiative and in so doing
galvanised both public and political consensus.
The decade-long conflict ended with the signing of a peace accord in
2006, in which the importance of land reform was acknowledged in the peacebuilding process, and later enshrined by the Interim Constitution as the right to
“scientific land reform…by ending the existing feudal system of land ownership”.
Following the 2006 People‟s Movement26, elections were set for April 2008 to
replace the 240-year-old monarchy with a 601-seat Constituent Assembly (CA),
governing a new federal democratic republic. Acknowledging the revolutionary
mood, all the main parties campaigned vigorously under pro-poor and pro-land
reform banners with the Maoists securing a convincing victory, though
significantly not an overall majority that would have permitted unilateral policymaking.
The institution of the CA established a genuinely inclusive platform,
representing those traditionally excluded from power (32.8% women members)
and offering genuine hope for more progressive politics. The Maoist victory saw
the emergence and consolidation of legitimate reformists within government; Dr
Babarum Bhattarai, Marxist intellectual and principle architect of the war, became
7
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Minister of Finance (2008-9), calling for agricultural revolution through
commercialisation and the end of feudalism; exemplifying his party‟s hybridised
communist-capitalist ideology, while noticeably dampening the more radical
rhetoric of the conflict era.
The Maoist-led government failed to function well from the outset,
relations with coalition partners were strained, while they antagonised rivals by
retaining land seized during the war.27 The political scene quickly deteriorated,
with the Maoists resigning from government in May 2009, sinking the country
into its present day protracted political crisis.28 A hastily assembled 22-party
coalition is now tasked with drafting the new constitution and getting the peace
process back on track, before fresh elections can be held, with the prospect of
restoring political coherence. In August 2011, Dr Bhattarai was sworn in as
Nepal‟s fourth Prime Minister in as many years to lead the fragile multi-party
coalition but he faces stiff opposition from both the Nepali Congress and the
UML, in addition to hardliners within his own party. While acknowledging this as
a significant hindrance to the prioritisation of land reform, this paper will avoid
conjecture and continue focusing upon manifest indicators of state commitment to
redistributive reform.
Concerns have been growing amongst the LRM that post-conflict
revolutionary fervour has waned in political realms with a growing emphasis on
agricultural modernisation over redistribution, failing to depart from past policy
(Nepali Times, 2008). The Ministry of Land Reform and Management‟s current
Three Year Plan (TYP) is continually preoccupied with anodyne donor-financed
land administration projects, such as records computerisation, which, in addition
to prioritising administration over governance, risks authenticating current
inequities and obstructing future redistribution. Taxation rather than appropriation
is still favoured as a deterrent to absentee landlordism, with paid taxes assuring
both private property and the status quo. The TYP identifies land redistribution,
but only to 200,000 land-deprived people (<1% rural population), focusing
mainly on ≈13,000 freed Kamaiya, implying little appetite for disturbing the
pattern of private holdings (Alden-Wily, 2009).
Following intense pressure from the LRM (a 13-day mass sit-in in
Kathmandu), a cross-party High-Level Commission for Land Reform was
established in December 2008, to design the framework for scientific land reform
and provide a roadmap for action. However, no sooner had the Commission set to
work than it fell victim to the political crisis, being reshuffled and reinstituted and
so far remaining fruitless. As part of state restructuring, the principle mandate for
the CA is to draft a new constitution, with provision for land reform not only
providing a litmus test of current state commitment, but potentially providing
constitutional guarantees for the land-deprived.29 The drafting process continues
to be well behind schedule (originally due May 2010), indicating a wider political
failure in consensus-building per se.
8
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Political revolution precipitated successful land reforms in East Asia, but
Nepal has so far failed to strike while the iron is hot; the revolutionary fervour of
the 2006 People‟s Movement has dissipated amidst political wrangling, land
reform becoming sidelined by, rather than synergising, constitution-drafting and
state restructuring. Contrasting the degree of social transformation required with
the level of political ambivalence, it is hardly surprising that land reform is
retreating from the spotlight. Tangible fears of mass unrest and the persistent drag
of stagnating agriculture could conceivably provide the impetus for broad
consensus-building, founded upon a combination of constitutional guarantee,
enlightened self-interest and exigency, but the decisive pro-reform coalition,
constitutive of Borras and McKinley‟s second pillar, is far from evident.
3.3

Pillar 3: Productivity-enhancing Support to the Agricultural Sector

Nepal‟s agricultural sector is plagued by numerous natural, cultural and
political constraints to development. A mountainous topography leaves just 17%
of land cultivable, while absentee landlords allow one-fifth of that to lay fallow
and hereditary caste systems fragment already small land holdings. 30 The porous
border with India and neoliberal structural adjustment undermine Nepal‟s policy
autonomy, while geographical remoteness and poor infrastructure constrain
foreign trade and splinter domestic markets. The often steep and fragile land is
easily damaged during the monsoon, with rapid deforestation and population
growth further exacerbating environmental degradation.31 The lack of irrigation,
outdated farming techniques and inputs combine with intransigent semi-feudal
relations of production to create persistent agricultural stagnation.
Against this backdrop, and with rising rural-urban inequality, the
government implemented the Agriculture Perspective Plan (APP) in 1996, with a
20-year horizon. Acknowledging that agriculture by necessity continues to
underwrite the economy, accounting for over one-third of GDP and more than
three-quarters of employment, the APP became the rhetorical centre of Nepal‟s
reinvigorated development strategy, combining broad-based growth with poverty
reduction.32 The Plan comprises four key elements: a wider dissemination and
adoption of agricultural technology; increased access to production inputs; sector
commercialisation and diversification; and infrastructure development alongside
market promotion. It is fundamentally a growth plan which aims to address
development goals through increased factor productivity in agriculture and
subsequent multiplier effects in non-farm sectors.33
While the APP embodies a commitment to enhancing productivity and
transforming the agrarian economy through investment and commercialisation, it
does so in the absence of a clear strategy for redistribution and within a climate of
accelerating neoliberal globalisation. There are concerns that this leaves the door
open to attempts at modernising agriculture without genuine land reform.
9
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Compounding this are fears for the sustainability of any redistribution, vis-à-vis
the APP‟s poor performance; 14-years after initiation, it has failed to boost
productivity, commercialise agriculture or alleviate rural poverty, with
agricultural growth stagnating at ≈3% for the last two decades (Sugden, 2009).34
The institutional structure, resource mobilisation and policy ideology are not
complementary to a small-farmer-beneficiaries-led productivity-enhancing
revolution, so key to successful redistributive reforms in East Asia (Borras et al,
2005).
Foreign aid contributes nearly one-third of public investment in
agriculture and the APP is heavily influenced by the funding and subsequent
neoliberal policies of its key donor, the ADB; liberalisation and deregulation are
prescribed to achieve comparative advantage in private-sector-led agricultural
growth, favouring larger farmers in both staples and higher value commodities.
Significant government withdrawal in pricing and marketing has led to an upward
(and fluctuating) shift in the relative prices of imported inputs, while competition
among private traders is insufficient to provide domestic alternatives. 35 The
sudden rise in input cost has led to a reversal in the adoption of modern
technology which already struggled to take root in remote subsistence conditions.
Cuts in subsidies were not compensated by measures such as easier access to
credit, leading to a reduction in the use of agricultural inputs (or use of lower
quality substitutes) by fiscally constrained small farmers, contributing to the poor
performance of agriculture and the adverse trend in rural poverty and inequality.36
The failure to invest in infrastructure and agricultural support services
has left small farmers in scattered production units, unable to leverage economies
of scale in aggregation and standardisation, within increasingly demanding
regulatory commodity chains. Nearly two-fifths of rural households live more
than two hours from a paved road while only one-fifth of irrigable land has access
to year-round irrigation. A nationwide network of R&D exists, but only covers
20-25% farmers, is ill-suited to the demands of emerging higher value agriculture
and insensitive to the context-specific requirements of distinct agro-ecological
zones.
Agricultural production has failed to keep pace with population demand,
while average yields are low compared to neighbouring countries (UNWFP,
2009). Yet spending on agriculture (as % of agricultural GDP) is in secular
decline; from ≈30% in the 1980s to ≈20% in the 1990s to its present level of 3%;
well below the minimum 10% that transforming countries invested in their growth
spurt years. There are positive signs, with the budget for agricultural investment
doubling over the past five years, but this is seriously undermined by underspending; after the first 10 months of the 2008/9 financial year, MoAC had spent
just 16.5% of its budget (UNWFP, 2009). Contributing to these constraints has
been Nepal‟s decade-long civil war, paralleling the APP‟s implementation the
conflict has drained resources, disrupted production, markets and the provision of
10
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inputs, with hopes of a „peace dividend‟ failing to materialise in a post-conflict
climate of continued political instability and neoliberal retrenchment.37
Agricultural growth is becoming increasingly reliant on the private
sector, which is budgeted to provide 70% of capital investment in the recent TYIP
(2007-10); an ambitious target given that private investment is generally a
function of public investment, added to the deterrent of protracted political
instability and increasing competition from neighbouring India and China. 38 Even
with finance forthcoming, the private sector tends to under-invest in agricultural
services characterised by long gestation periods and public-good attributes,
hurting poorer farmers and potential land reform beneficiaries. Foreign and
private investment can stimulate Nepal‟s agriculture but this capital often requires
a system of protection for private property, which could come into conflict with
non-market redistributive land reform.
Many of the persistent failings of agriculture, and indeed the APP, can
be linked to semi-feudal land relations and the consequent underperformance of
factors of production, where innovation and investment are clearly inhibited by
(largely absentee) landlords and exploitative tenancy arrangements. Although
these constraints could arguably diminish through redistributive reform, simply
acquiring land is insufficient to raise production and improve market
competitiveness. This fact was illustrated by the recent Kamaiya land
beneficiaries who struggled to meet their livelihood needs after failing to receive
adequate support services, in addition to receiving poor quality land that required
even greater investment.
There is potential for gains to be made in agriculture; between 2002-07
rice production increased in Bangladesh by 16%, Pakistan 24% and India 31%
while Nepal‟s decreased by 1% (UNWFP, 2009). The FAO estimates that cereal
production in Nepal can be raised by 20%, simply through using improved seeds,
and to this effect the APP has implemented the District Seed Self-Sufficiency
Programme (1996), expected to cover all districts by 2011. Hope lies in this and
other APP programmes that focus on small farmer cooperatives to diffuse
technology, reduce marketing costs and build economies of scale, as part of a
general decentralisation of the institutional landscape that can better
accommodate diverse local contexts.
The APP acknowledges three important determinants of Nepal‟s
agricultural performance: access to land, access to inputs and the ability to
diversify and commercialise; each could precipitate the other in a comprehensive
plan oriented to small-farmer-led modernisation, with land reform the potential
catalyst for transformation. The APP will need to overcome significant fiscal,
institutional, and ideological constraints before Nepal can have a solid third pillar,
realising its long-delayed green revolution and creating a solid foundation for
sustainable land reform.
11
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3.4

Pillar 4: Pro-poor Growth-oriented Development Strategy

Nepal missed out on the robust rise of its neighbours, burdened with the
lowest per capita GDP in the region (current US$ 438) and an average annual
growth rate of 1.9% between 1990-2008 (WB, 2010).39 Semi-feudal land
relations, geographical remoteness, two decades of falling agricultural
productivity, 25-years of failed neoliberal policy, 10-years of civil conflict, the
under-developing influence of de facto free trade with India, rapid population
growth, recent severe droughts and global food and financial crises have
combined to paint a socio-economic scene of stagnant agriculture and
manufacturing, public sector retrenchment, an unprecedented trade deficit, food
insecurity, intransigent rural poverty and rising inequality. Trends towards
deagrarianisation, underemployment and livelihood diversification have
intensified over the last decade with increasing rural out-migration for domesticurban, Indian and global employment opportunities, indicating the need for a
comprehensive development strategy to address multidimensional causes of
poverty and secure the poverty-reducing potential of land.40 41
Following a period of high inflation and severe budgetary deficit in the
early-1980s, Nepal‟s economic agenda has been appropriated by IFIs and
international donors. Stabilisation and structural adjustment began in 1985 with a
further push towards privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation after the
restoration of democracy in 1990/1.42 Nepal has faithfully executed continuous
neoliberal prescriptions, becoming one of the most „open‟ countries in South Asia
and the first LDC member of the WTO (in 2004).43 44 Economic liberalisation,
embodying a political process, has tended to subjugate the rural poor to the power
of national and global capital, through the deregulation of markets and the
removal of subsidies and price-supports. Nepal now faces dire problems
simultaneously on both domestic and international fronts and the main reason a
full-blown economic crisis has been avoided is the compensatory surge in
remittances, now threatened by the global downturn.45
Bilateral and multilateral aid agencies have increased their influence
over Nepal‟s development process, currently accounting for 53% of public sector
development expenditure, rising from 3.6% GDP in 2007 to 4.7% in 2009, partly
reflecting donor optimism in the peace process (WB, 2010). Such high levels of
aid dependence with shifting donor priorities poses a significant barrier to longterm strategic continuity, with elites seen to control the form and disbursement of
aid, consolidating existing power structures. Under contemporary neoliberalism,
donor-led development tends to mobilise the poor as autonomous entrepreneurs,
capable of finding solutions to their own problems through the global market,
forgoing concepts of rights and entitlement and obviating the need for structural
change. This runs counter to the ideology inherent in redistributive reform and
together with the dialectic of pursuing inclusive growth on the back of liberalised
12
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capitalism (and a reduced state), could impede a pro-poor growth framework
conducive to land reform.
Compelled by rising rural-urban inequality and in gradual recognition
that past economic reform did not benefit the poor, poverty reduction has become
the overarching development goal since the Ninth Plan (1998-2002), with the
Tenth Plan (2002-07) continuing to act as Nepal‟s PRSP.46 Broad-based economic
growth, infrastructure development, targeted poverty alleviation and good
governance are strategic PRSP targets, while the APP prioritises the agricultural
sector in recognition that poverty is primarily a rural issue; 47 signalling a positive
departure from previous urban-centric solutions and corresponding with country
studies by Thorbecke and Jung (1996) and Datt and Ravallion (1998) showing
agricultural sector growth having the greatest effect on poverty reduction in
agrarian societies.
Borras and McKinley note that aligning development strategy with
achieving the MDGs can provide a pro-poor framework to sustain the socioeconomic transformation inherent in redistributive reform. There are positive
signs in this respect; the current TYIP is tailored specifically to achieving the
MDGs, with Nepal clearly on track for MDG1 (Target 1a) to “reduce by half the
proportion of people living on less than $1/day (PPP value) by 2015” (UNDP,
2010).48 However, potential shortfalls towards MDGs for hunger, maternal
mortality and primary education, led the MDG Needs Assessment Report (2006)
to call for a doubling of donor funding to meet the $12.6bn required to achieve
these goals, further deepening donor influence tied to externally-set time-bound
targets.
Recent performance in reducing poverty is much heralded, with a
significant fall from 42% (1995/6) to 31% (2003/4). This headline figure though,
obscures a more complex picture of rising vertical (class-based) and horizontal
(regional/inter-group/ethnic) inequality, burdening Nepal with the highest Gini
coefficient in Asia, increasing from 0.34 to 0.47 over the last decade (UNDP,
2010).49 This is particularly damaging to a pro-poor agenda, as initial conditions
of high inequality have been shown to impede the poverty-reducing effect of
growth. Furthermore, much of this acclaimed poverty reduction is accounted for
by expanding remittances, rather than any structural change; bypassing the
poorest, mainly marginal farmers and landless labourers, who have least access to
off-farm opportunities, remittances, or more fundamentally, land.50
Since the 1990s, Nepal has steadily become a net importer of food,
through a combination of low agricultural productivity, high population growth
and changing consumer preferences. High and fluctuating food prices are a
particular threat to poverty reduction, with the poor, who are net purchasers,
typically spending >80% of their income on food. 42 out of Nepal‟s 75 districts
are estimated to be food deficit while half (49%) of children <5 are chronically
malnourished, the highest level outside Africa (UNWFP, 2009).51 The
13
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government has responded with individualised donor-driven alleviation
programmes targeting the poorest,52 but a recent Land Use Policy (2010) signifies
a more structural foundation for food security, granting legal protection for fertile
land from urban and industrial development, creating a potential cornerstone for
future land reform.
State commitment to decentralisation and the devolution of decisionmaking powers to locally elected bodies, provides perhaps the most positive
signal for Nepal‟s pro-poor growth. Taking democratisation and inclusion as
means to improve livelihoods, the Local Self-Governance Act (LSGA) (1999)
devolves increasing powers over local administration and resource management
to 75 District Development Committees and 3,914 Village Development
Committees.53 By empowering locally elected bodies to meet the great diversity
of needs, the LSGA could provide an institutional framework for innovative and
progressive community-led land reform, able to bring beneficiaries into the
process as decision-makers, implementers and monitors, capturing local
knowledge, reducing administrative costs and enhancing sustainability.
Nepal‟s overall development strategy focuses on broad-based growth,
underpinned by the commercialisation of agriculture to stimulate the wider
economy and reduce poverty. Policy space is constrained by macro-economic
commitments to IFIs and donor-led development, while the recent civil war and
ongoing political instability have further impacted growth.54 While the APP, the
LSGA and commitments to the MDGs, constitute major initiatives towards a prorural pro-poor agenda, economic liberalisation, widespread food insecurity and
rising inequality undermine the performance and integrity of this pillar. There is
an inherent dialectic in pursuing pro-poor growth while leaving the underlying
structures that perpetuate poverty undisturbed, highlighting the importance of
integrating land reform into the development process.
4.0

Conclusion: Can Nepal’s Land Reform Stand Up?

This explorative analysis did not seek to provide definitive conclusions,
which may in any case be incompatible in the context of a stubbornly elusive
scientific land reform; nevertheless a focused evaluation has revealed flaws and
fortés in Nepal‟s character, capacity and compulsion to support comprehensive
transformative reform.
Beneficiaries provided the only solid foundation from which to support
and propel the land reform process, by leading demand, innovating communitybased models and possessing the potential to implement and sustain a devolved
and decentralised redistribution. The LRM has succeeded in broadening its
strategy to enhance capacity, symbolism and momentum while retaining the vital
ingredients of autonomy and representation. Transcending the right to land from
its anti-feudal origins to become a basic human right has offered a more
14
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democratised approach, opening new political spaces with greater opportunity for
pro-poor structural outcomes. With increasing civil society solidarity, the LRM
can continue its strategic mobilisation, fortifying state-society institutional bridges
and converting political rhetoric into action.
While state-society links provide hope, state-elite alliances continue to
pose the main impediment. The emergence of the Maoists, with the potential to
derive their power through mobilisation of the poor, rather than elite alliances, has
given greater political weight to reform, alongside more inclusive parliamentary
representation and legislated commitments to devolution. Politics has
democratised sufficiently to address structural transformation in the context of
land reform (and vice versa), but the current political turmoil and persistent
procrastination appears unlikely to provide the decisive pro-reform coalition,
necessary to bridge the effort from below; more likely in the present form, it will
oversee the gradual reconstitution of feudal alliances into capitalist partnerships,
with land reform sidelined rather than central to state restructuring and peacebuilding.
Political reluctance towards land reform is reflected in the APP‟s
ideological, institutional and resource deficits, compounding Nepal‟s numerous
physical and socio-economic constraints. The caprice of foreign aid, neoliberal
hegemony and the private sector‟s profit-compulsion, further restrict agricultural
policy space and undermine small-farmer-led modernisation, in the face of rising
food requirements. Redistribution can provide an expeditious tool for socioeconomic transformation but without subsequent improvements in productivity,
the momentum behind reform can quickly evaporate (Borras et al, 2006). The
absence of land reform in the APP‟s drive to commercialise is foreboding, while
the current trend to provide low quality land to reform beneficiaries will create the
need for even greater levels of support. If the APP is to enable beneficiaries to
launch self-reliant competitive farming, with links to broader off-farm
development, redistribution will need to be integrated within an astute agricultural
strategy, requiring significant boosts to wide-ranging investment, legitimate
implementation and an ideological reorientation towards small farmer
beneficiaries.
There are positives in Nepal‟s moves towards decentralisation and
functional devolution; democratising political space for local actors encourages a
pro-poor trajectory, but entrenched rural poverty, food insecurity and rising
inequality undermine the poverty-reducing effect of any growth. Neoliberal
retrenchment and donor-driven development restrict policy space, with the threat
of anodyne or market-based poverty alleviation potentially obviating deeper
structural change. Despite valid commitments to the MDGs, it may be argued that
development strategy can only be superficially inclusive until comprehensive land
reform has restructured the underlying power base that perpetuates and
reproduces cycles of poverty. However, were redistribution to be implemented in
15
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the current context, it may fail to achieve much beyond short-term asset gains for
the poor, lure unwitting beneficiaries into debt and penury and expose itself to
potential reversal.
This provisional exploration has exposed a less than solid foundation for
pro-poor redistributive land reform in Nepal, revealing a strong LRM (pillar 1),
weak state-support (pillar 2), constrained agricultural policy (pillar 3) and
compromised development strategy (pillar 4). Borras and McKinley‟s paradigm
captured the fundamental features that could underpin success, with each pillar
appearing both necessary and integral. Had Nepal compared more favourably visà-vis a pro-reform political consensus, small-farmer-led agricultural
modernisation and genuine pro-poor development, the country could be well
placed to implement and sustain its mandated land reform, despite the noted
impediments extraneous to the analytical framework. But land reform cannot
balance on a single pillar.
Establishing the foundations for successful reform entails a process of
inherent contestation and interdependence between the agencies of state, society
and the market, embodied by the interaction of the 4 pillars. Hope lies with the
power of beneficiaries to catalyse political consensus and force progressive
policy; if subsequent land reform is enabled to enhance productivity, alongside
greater equity, positive feedback will ensue, synergising the political, social and
economic process and reinforcing the 4 pillars. Such optimism though, must
ultimately be tempered by the weight of pragmatism; the post-conflict, new
democratic republic of Nepal faces a profound set of risks, challenges and
transformations: The task ahead cannot be overstated.

Notes

1

Average 2% annual population growth rate (2002-2008) (WB, 2008).
The UNWFP (2009) has been operating in Nepal since 2006, where 41% of the
population are undernourished and 80% children <5-years are malnourished.
3
Defined as holdings <0.5ha by the latest National Agriculture Census.
4
This rather nebulous term incorporates redistribution with growth alongside the
commercialisation of agriculture.
5
Based upon research by Borras et al (2005) for ISS/UNDP.
6
Ten country studies: Armenia, Bolivia, Brazil, Egypt, Ethiopia, Namibia, the
Philippines, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.
7
The failure of land reforms to significantly reduce poverty in Bolivia and Mexico has
been linked to insufficient state-support following redistribution.
8
The nearest seaport for accessing the world‟s economy is 900kms away (in India).
9
The open border and high cost of access to international markets puts Nepal in de facto
free trade with (a more heavily subsidised and powerful) India.
2
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10

The 1964 Lands Act is covered in sub-section 3.2.
The landless people‟s movement has never become, in and of itself, a political party
(Basnet, 2008).
12
These are not necessarily mutually exclusive categories.
13
The threat of revolutionary uprising played an important role in making land reform
politically feasible in both El Salvador (1980‟s) and South Vietnam (early 1970‟s)
(Alden-Wily, 2009).
14
Established in 2004 by CSRC (a Nepali CSO encouraging land rights activism) to
integrate people‟s organisations representing landless and land-deprived farmers.
15
Of a total 1.7m landless and tenant households (average household size 5.3) across 75
districts (CSRC, 2010).
16
CSRC/NLRF initiated a weekly nationwide radio programme on land rights, on Nepal
FM since January 2009.
17
NLRF leaders met with the Prime Minister in 2008 to agree the formation of the HighLevel Commission for Land Reform, arranging a seat on the Commission for the NLRF
chairperson.
18
Six international donors (ActionAid Nepal, Care Nepal, CCO/CIDA,
DanidaHUGOU, MS Nepal, Oxfam GB) formed the „National Alliance for Land and
Agrarian Reform‟ in 2009, to support the NLRF.
19
NLRF mass encampments build critical awareness of the political economy of land
rights amongst land-deprived farmers.
20
Many Madhesis perceive land reform as a politically motivated means to redistribute
their fertile Terai land to Pahadis from the hills; based on outcomes of earlier migrations
and land reforms.
21
Up to 50% of males (15-59-yrs) in many hill villages now work overseas.
22
Bonded labourers; legally emancipated in 2000.
23
Successful land reform in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea depended upon the power
and authority of local-level committees (Alden-Wily, 2009).
24
Nepal can take heart from Kerala (India), where land reforms were both a response to,
and reinforcement of, democratisation; itself the product of evolving struggles (Herring,
1999).
25
The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist held only 4 of 205 parliamentary seats in 1996.
26
Seen as a continuation of the 1990 People‟s Movement; 19-days of popular street
protests in April forced the King to rescind the absolute power he assumed under the
pretext of combating the Maoists.
27
The Maoists made an agreement before the 2008 elections to return land seized by
Maoist soldiers and their supporters during the war; this process has been slow and has
met with resistance by some peasants reluctant to comply.
28
After a government decision to sack the Chief of Staff of the Nepali Army was
rescinded by the President.
29
Such guarantees have underpinned success in West Bengal and the Philippines, while
constitutional shortcomings in Nepal allowed the Supreme Court to overrule ceiling
reductions in 2001 (Linghorn, 2008).
30
Average holding size is 0.8ha.
31
The area under natural forest has halved in the last 30-years, to make way for a
population that has doubled in the same period.
11

17

Himalayan Journal of Development and Democracy, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2011

32

The country development strategy will be examined under Pillar 4.
The APP‟s objective is to raise annual agricultural growth from ≈3% to 5% by 2015.
34
The government recently downgraded its 2010 growth projection from 3.3% to 1.1%,
the lowest in the region (WB, 2010).
35
Fertilizers rose to international price levels with the abolition of subsidies in 1999.
36
72% of institutional finance schemes in Nepal require some form of collateral, usually
land, acting as a considerable barrier for small farmers, tenants and sharecroppers.
37
Conflict accounted for 15% of the annual government budget in 2005.
38
The obverse is the potential of these two markets.
39
The government recently downgraded its 2010 GDP growth projection from 5.5% to
3.5% (WB, 2010).
40
66% of the economically active population was engaged in agriculture in 2001, falling
from 91% in 1981 (CBS, 2004).
41
The urban population grew from 4% (1971) to 13.9% (2001) and is expected to reach
26.7% by 2021 (CBS, 2005).
42
Opportunities for dramatic neoliberal reform only came after India began to liberalise
sincerely in the early 1990s and despite commitments to social democracy the main
parties embraced reforms such as privatisation.
43
The latest being an IMF Rapid Credit Facility in May 2010, requiring further procyclical retrenchment.
44
There is little WTO impact to date; Action Aid reported that Nepal was even initially
unable to expend its allocation of „green-box‟ subsidies for domestic agricultural support.
45
Accounting for 22% GDP in 2008/9 (excluding informal flows and flows from India)
(WB, 2010).
46
From 1988-1996, 16% annualised growth in urban centres contrasted with <3%
(negative after inflation) in rural areas (Miklian, 2009).
47
95% of Nepal‟s income poor reside in rural areas (ADB, 2009).
48
Poverty line adjusted to $1.25/day in 2008.
49
In Kathmandu, poverty incidence is 3%, while in the mid-Western district of Rolpa, it
is 59% (UNDP, 2010).
50
WB (2010) estimates 30% households receive remittances.
51
Unless production increases significantly, Nepal will become stably food deficit within
the next 3-5 years (UNWFP, 2010).
52
A State Privileged Identity Card will soon grant the right to buy subsidised food,
alongside donor-assisted food-aid and food-for-work schemes.
53
Resources allocated to local community needs-based programmes, increased from 1%
of expenditure in 2000 to 7% in 2009, budgeted at 8% for 2010 and expected to increase
further in the next TYP (2011-2013); however central-level spending is ≈5 times higher
than district-level (WB, 2010).
54
One recent study estimated the war‟s opportunity cost at 3% of current GDP (Pradhan,
2009).
33
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